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nificance of this decision is that it tends to extend the life line of the unstated
exception to the anti-trust laws which the Supreme Court appears to be evolving as it confronts the regulations of auctions or open markets such as a commodity exchange.42 The permissible scope of these regulations is still subject to
speculation. But the drift is perceptible, and the Cargill case clearly indicates
its direction.

ENFORCEMENT OF PRIOR SUPPORT ORDER FOLLOWING
EX PARTE FOREIGN DIVORCE
In 1943 the plaintiff, Mrs. Estin, brought an action for separation in New
York in which her husband entered a general appearance. Upon a finding that
the plaintiff had been abandoned, the court awarded her $i8o a month as permanent alimony. Shortly thereafter the husband went to Nevada, and a year
later instituted suit for divorce in which the wife was served only by publication and made no appearance. Upon entry of the Nevada decree of absolute
divorce, the husband ceased making payments under the New York separation
decree. In Mrs. Estin's subsequent suit for arrears, the New York Court of
Appeals held that the ex parte Nevada divorce, although effective to dissolve
the marriage, did not terminate the husband's duty to support his spouse.'
On certiorari, the Supreme Court of the United States affirmed this judgment.
Estin v. Estin.2

There was no question of the bona fides of the defendant's Nevada residence
and hence no contention that the ex parte divorce did not dissolve the marital
relationship.3 But many courts have held, as did the New York Court of
Appeals in the instant case, that the rendition of a valid foreign4 decree of
divorce, secured by one spouse upon constructive service, does not terminate the
liability to pay alimony under a prior decree for separate maintenance s The
husband here argued, despite such decisions, that the Full Faith and Credit
42 Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (i9i8); United States v. New York Coffee
& Sugar Exchange, Inc., 263 U.S. 6xi (1924).
x Estin v. Estin, 296 N.Y. 308,73 N.E. 2d 113 (i947), noted in 47 Col. L. Rev. io69 (I947).
2 68 S. Ct. 12 r3 (1948). Justices Frankfurter and Jackson wrote dissenting opinions. See also
the companion case of Kreiger v. Kreiger, 68 S. Ct. 1221 (1948), in which the same two justices
dissented.
3 Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942), 325 U.S. 226 (1945).
4 The term "foreign" as used herein applies to sister states.
s Estin v. Estin, 296 N.Y. 308, 73 N.E. 2d 113 (1947); Security Trust Co. v. Woodward
73 F. Supp. 667 (N.Y., 1947); Basset v. Basset, 41 F. 2d 954 (C.C.A. 9th, 1944), cert. den. 323
U.S. 718 (i944); Durlacher v. Durlacher, 123 F. 2d 70 (C.C.A. 9 th, i94i), cert. den. 315 U.S.
805 (1942); Metzger v. Metzger, 32 Ohio App. 202, 167 N.E. 69o (1929); Miller v. Miller, 200
Iowa 1193, 206 N.W. 262 (1925); Simonton v. Simonton, 4o Idaho 751, 236 Pac. 863 (1925);
Dorey v. Dorey, 248 Mass. 359, 142 N.E. 774 (1924); 3 Nelson, Divorce and Annulment § 32.48
(2d ed., 1945); see Barber v. Barber, 21 How. (U.S.) 582 (1858); Bennet v. Tomlinson, 206
Iowa 1075, 221 N.W. 837 (1928).
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Clause 6 not only required the New York court to recognize the Nevada divorce
as valid but also compelled it to extinguish the obligation to support his ex-wife.
However, it is well recognized that the Full Faith and Credit Clause places
no requirement upon one state to recognize the efficacy of an in personam decree
of a court of a sister state rendered without jurisdiction over the party defendantQ7 And while the Nevada court could terminate the marital relation because of its jurisdiction over the husband and the marriage, 8 it had no power to
adjudicate the question of the wife's right to support because of its lack of
jurisdiction over her. Thus, the ex parte Nevada divorce imposes no constitutional requirement on the state of New York to abandon its priot separate
maintenance order9
Furthermore, the full impact of the majority opinion not only denies the
applicability of the Full Faith and Credit Clause but also suggests that any
other action on the part of the New York court would be a violation of the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Ever since 1877 it has been clear
that no personal judgment could be rendered against a defendant who was not
personally served or did not voluntarily appear.'0 The Supreme Court of the
United States, in the leading case of Pennoyer v. Neff, stated, "Proceedings in a
court of justice to determine the personal rights and obligations of parties over
whom the court has no jurisdiction do not constitute due process of law."' ,,And
since the Court considers alimony a debt,12 Justice Douglas' statement in the
Estin case cannot be seriously questioned: "[W]e are aware of no power which
6 U.S. Const. Art. 4, § I
7Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (i945); Pink v. A.A.A. Highway Express,
314 U.S. 201 (1941); Old Wayne Mutual Life Ass'n v. McDonough, 204 U.S. 8 (907);
Botz v. Helvering, 134 F. 2d 538 (C.C.A. 8th, 1943); Operative Plasterers' and Cement
Furnishers' International Ass'n v. Case, 93 F. 2d 56 (App. D.C., 1937); Stewart v. Eaton, 287

Mich. 466, 283 N.W. 65i (1939).
$Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
9 In Glaston v. Glaston, 69 Cal. App. 2d 787, x6o P. 2d 45 (1945), the California court refused to give full faith and credit to a New York separate maintenance decree in which the wife
was awarded a separation from bed and board and $ioo per month alimony. Since the husband
was served only by publication and did not appear in the New York action, the California
court recognized the New York judgment as a separation from bed and board but refused to
recognize its validity as an in personam money judgment because of the lack of personal
service.
xoPennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (877). The limitations placed on the broad doctrine of the
Pennoyer case by Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, 294 U.S. 623 (1935), and Hess v. Pawloski,
274 U.S. 352 (1927), are inapplicable in the present case.
"x95 U.S. 714, 733 (1877). The Court, however, did not exclude the possibility of an ex
parte divorce, for it declared, "To prevent any misapplication of the views expressed in this
opinion, it is proper to observe that we do not mean to assert, by anything we have said, that
a State may not authorize proceedings to determine the staltus of one of its citizens toward a
non-resident, which would be binding within the State, though made without service of :process
or personal notice to the non-resident." Ibid., at 734.
x2Sistare v. Sistare, 2x8 U.S. i (igio); Barber v. Barber, 21 How. (U.S.) 582 (1858); Is
Alimony a Debt?, 27 Va. L. Rev. 914 (94i). But cf. Lynde v. Lynde, i81 U.S. z83 (I9oi),
for an apparently inconsistent holding which was distinguished in Sistare v. Sistare, supra.

RECENT CASES
the State of the domicile of the debtor has to determine the personal rights of
the creditor in the intangible unless the creditor has been personally served or
appears in the proceeding."'3 The force of this argument had been anticipated
by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Bassett v. Bassett,'4 where the court
refused to terminate provisions for alimony under a separate maintenance decree despite a provision in the ex parte Nevada divorce decree "that the plaintiff
be and is herebyreleased from any further obligation to support and maintain
the defendant, and he is discharged and released from the duties and obligations to support the said defendant under [the]... judgment entered against
him....

))Is

While other courts have held that a valid ex parte divorce does terminate the
right to receive alimony under a prior decree of separate maintenance, 6 the
thrust of the Estin decision indicates that such holdings are incompatible with
the Due Process Clause. This would be a logical application of the views expressed by Justice Douglas both here and in his concurring opinion in Esenwein
v. Commonwealth. 7 For the violation of the Due Process Clause involved in
terminating the right of support decreed to a spouse solely on the basis of a
divorce obtained without her appearance before the court would be no less
serious than the distortion of the Full Faith and Credit Clause which would result from a holding that the New York court must abandon its order for support
because of an ex parte Nevada divorce. A court having jurisdiction over the
parties would not infringe due process by discontinuing an order for support on
grounds of the husband's inability to pay, a changed set of conditions whereby
the wife no longer needs financial aid, or other mitigating circumstances. But to
terminate such an order solely on the basis of an ex parte foreign divorce seems
clearly unconstitutional.
The result of the majority opinion in the instant case is "to make the divorce
'3

Estin v. Estin, 68 S. Ct.

1213, 1218

(1948).

954 (C.C.A. 9th, 1944).
ISIbid., at 955.
z6 Gullet v. Gullet, i49 F. 2d 17 (App. D.C., '945); State v. Lynch, 42 Del. 95, 28 A. 2d
163 (1942); McCullough v. McCullough, 203 Mich. 288, 168 N.W. 929 (igi8); Harrison v.
Harrison, 2o Ala. 629 (1852); see Fox v. Wiley, 184 P. 2d 782 (Okla., 1947). "The dissolution
of the marriage relation extinguishes the subject matter which forms the basis of an action or
proceeding for separate maintenance." Herrick v. Herrick, 55 Nev. 59, 68, 25 P. 2d 378, 380
14 141 F. 2d

(1933).
17325

U.S.

279, 282

(1945).

"...

[Ilt is not apparent that the spouse who obtained the

decree can defeat an action for maintenance or support in another State by showing that he

was domiciled in the State which awarded him the divorce decree. It is one thing if the spouse
from whom the decree of divorce is obtained appears or is personally served.... But I am not
convinced that in the absence of an appearance or personal service the decree need be given
full faith and credit when it comes to the maintenance or support of the other spouse or the
children. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714." The Esenwein case arose in Pennsylvania, which apparently follows the rule that an absolute divorce, even though granted
ex parte, terminates obligations under an outstanding separate maintenance decree; but since
the entire Nevada proceeding was held void for want of domiciliary jurisdiction, the constitutionality of this rule was not adjudicated.
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divisible-to give effect to the Nevada decree insofar as it affects the marital
status and to make it ineffective on the issue of alimony."'" But Justice Jackson, in his dissenting opinion, thought this division illogical. While he still
believes that a divorce obtained by constructive service after a short residence
should not be recognized,'9 he contends that if such 'a divorce must be considered valid, its effect is necessarily to terminate the plaintiff's right to alimony. This conclusion is based on the belief that New York law would allow the
cessation of alimony payments under the separation decree had the ex parte
divorce been granted in New York. Justice Frankfurter shared this view,
20
although he favored remanding the case for clarification of New York law.
The two dissenting opinions thus raise the question of the effect on a prior
separate maintenance award of a subsequent divorce obtained in the same state
which granted separate maintenance. Even where both parties have been present before the divorce court of their domicil, the courts have split on this issue,2
although some decisions which seem to fall into this class of cases can be distinguished on grounds of estoppel,- consent of both parties to the alimony
award,' or provisions made in the separate maintenance 4 or divorces decree.
When both parties appear in the divorce proceedings, it should make little difference what conclusion the court reaches. Each case must be decided on its own
merits, and it would be just as appropriate for the court to declare that the
husband need not continue to pay alimony as it would be for the court to conclude that the provisions of the separate maintenance decree should continue
or even be increased. For it is the domiciliary state which is fundamentally concerned with the status of its residents, and it should be of small consequence
whether it provides for those residents in a decree of divorce or a decree for
separate maintenance.
However, in the only case in which a separate maintenance decree was followed by an ex parte divorce proceeding in the same state, the Arkansas Supreme Court held that the prior award was unaffected. 6 No cases have been
' 8 Estin v. Estin, 68 S. Ct. 1213, 2218 (1948).
19

See Justice Jackson's dissent in Williams v. North Carolina, 37 U.S. 287, 311 (1942),

to which he referred in the Estin case, 68 S. Ct. 1213, 1221 (1948).
"0Frankfurter, J., dissenting in Estin v. Estin, 68 S. Ct. 1213, 1219 (1948).
"'The divorce does not terminate alimony under the separate maintenance decree: Robin-

son v. Robinson, 250 Ky. 488, 63 S.W. 2d 6o5 (1933); Bragg v. Bragg, 232 L.T.R. 346 (1924);
Williams v. Williams, 96 Ky. 397, 29 S.W. 132 (1895). The divorce does terminate alimony:
Holmes v. Holmes, 155 F. 2d 737 (App. D.C., z946); Atkinson v. Atkinson, 233 Ala. 125, 170
So. i98 (i936); see generally 166 A.L.R. 1004 (1947).
" Bowers v. Bowers, 132 N.J. Eq. 431, 28 A. 2d 515
Eq. 395, 157 Atl. 649 (193).
23 Cox v. Cox, 197 Ga. 260, 29 S.E. 2d 83 (i944).

(1942);

Schimek v. Schimek, io9 N.J.

Simmons v. Simmons, 223 N.C. 841, 28 S.E. 2d 489 (x944).
Pickel v. Pickel, 291 Mo. i8o, 236 S.W. 287 (1921).
' 6 Wagster v. Wagster, 193 Ark. 902, 103 S.W. 2d 638 (i937). The wife had recovered
alimony of $i5 per month in a separate maintenance proceeding. When the husband later
'4

'5
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found to sustain Justice Jackson's statement that by New York law, "if after a
decree of separation and alimony, the husband had obtained a New York divorce against his wife, it would terminate her right to alimony. 27 Although New
York courts have extinguished the duty to pay alimony under a separation
decree where the wife instituted foreign divorce proceedings"l or when the wife
appeared in a foreign divorce suit,29 no New York decision has ever declared a
support order terminated because of an ex parte New York divorce. But even
if such a precedent existed, the contention of the dissenting justice is adequately
answered by the majority: "The difficulty with that argument is that the highest court inNew York has held in this case that a support order can survive
divorce and that this one has survived petitioner's divorce.... It is not for us
to say whether that ruling squares with what the New York courts have said on
earlier occasions. It is enough that New York today says that such is her
policy."130
Not only is it constitutionally imperative for a court which has awarded a
separate maintenance order to continue to enforce its decree in the absence of
mitigating circumstances, but the result is also to be preferred in the light of the
underlying policy which motivates an award of support. The doctrine that the
rendition of a valid foreign divorce secured by one spouse upon constructive
service will terminate liability to pay under a prior separate maintenance decree3l is undoubtedly rooted in the history of alimony law. Absolute divorce was
unknown to the early English common law and was available only by a private
act of Parliament prior to the Divorce Act of 1857. Alimony could only be
awarded by the courts in an action for separation.32 Consequently, it is not surprising to hear modem courts expound the theory that an action for separate
maintenance is dependent upon the existence of the marital relation and can
only be maintained while that relation continues.33 Of course, once this asmoved out of the state and his wife was granted a divorce on constructive service, the court
decided that the prior decree had not been extinguished.
27

Estin v. Estin, 68 S.Ct.

1213, 1221

(1948).

28Turkus v. Turkus, I8o N.Y. Misc. 857, 45 N.Y.S. 2d 8o3 (1943); Almquist v. Almquist,
43 N.Y.S. 2d 240 (i943) (husband appeared); Scheinwald v. Scheinwald, 231
App. Div. 757, 246 N.Y. Supp. 33 (1930) (husband appeared); Harris v. Harris, z97 App.
Div. 646, 189 N.Y. Supp. 215 (1921); Gibson v. Gibson, 81 N.Y. Misc. 5o8, 143 N.Y. Supp. 37
(1913).
29 Solotoff v. Solotoff, 51 N.Y.S. 2d 514 (1944); Richards v. Richards, 87 N.Y. Misc. 134,
149 N.Y. Supp. 1028 (i914).
30 Estin v. Estin, 68 S. Ct. 1213, 1216 (948).
3' Cases cited note 16 supra.
32 Vernier and Hurlbut, The Historical Background of Alimony Law and its Present Statutory Structure, 6 Law & Contemp. Prob. 197 (i939); 27 C.J.S. Divorce § 202 (941).
33 "Since the husband's duty to support the wife arises from the marital relation.., the wife
cannot maintain an action for separate maintenance after a decree of divorce .. ." 42 C.J.S.
Husband and Wife § 612 (I944), citing Stout v. Stout, 182 Okla. 490, 78 P. 2d 665 (1938);

Atkinson v. Atkinson, 233 Ala. 125, 170 So. z98 (1936); Reppert v. Reppert,
N.W. 487 (1932); Hughes v. Hughes, 21X Ky. 799, 278 S.W. 121 (1925).
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sumption is made, it is only a short step to a.statement thatothe dissolution of
the marriage concludes the right to receive alimony decreed in a prior separate
maintenance action.
But it is clearly preferable to reason that a valid ex parte divorce need not
preclude the continuation of payments decreed by a prior separation order.
Such an award is to be considered not as punishment but rather as a means of
providing for the needy spouse. Whether or not the wife is the guilty party
should have no bearing on the issue, although the old Ecclesiastical courts would
award permanent alimony only to an innocent wife who had secured the separation. "[This unenlightened view [is] totally blind to the fact that a guilty wife
may starve as quickly as an innocent one... ,,34 and, indeed, only five states
now limit an award of alimony to the case of an innocent wife who is a petitioner.35 Furthermore, the need for support would continue to exist even
though the wife had appeared in the foreign divorce proceedings. Although the
general rule seems to be that future alimony payments under a prior decree for
separate maintenance are cut off when the wife appears in the husband's foreign
divorce action,36 the preferable view would continue the alimony payments
awarded the needy spouse either where she procured the ex parte divorce37 or
where she contested a foreign divorce.3 Of course, if the foreign court had jurisdiction over both parties and made a new alimony award, the decree for separate maintenance might well be superseded.9 Nonetheless, it must not be forgotten that it is the wife's domiciliary state which is primarily concerned with
her welfare.
The Supreme Court in the Estin case recognized the necessity for continuing
support to the wife under the decree of separate maintenance despite the rendition of a valid foreign divorce. "In this case, New York evinced a concern with
this broken marriage when both parties were domiciled in New York and before
Nevada had any concern with it. New York was rightly concerned lest the abandoned spouse be left impoverished and perhaps become a public charge. The
problem of her livelihood and support is plainly a matter in which her community had a legitimate interest."14 ° Although the Court "put to one side the
case where the wife was personally served or where she appears in the divorce
34

Vernier and Hurlbut, op. cit. supra note 6, at I9q.

S Ibid., at 210.
36 EX parte Jones, 249 Ala. 386, 31 So. 2d 314 (1947); Shaw v. Shaw, 332 Ill. App. 442, 75
N.E. 2d 411 (1947) (no printed opinion); Solotoff v. Solotoff, 51 N.Y.S. 2d 514 ('944); Mezger
v. Mezger, i55 L.T.R. 491 (1936); Commonwealth v. Parker, 59 Pa. Super. 74 (igr5); Richards
v. Richards, 87 N.Y. Misc. 134, 149 N.Y. Supp. 1028 (1914).
37 Wagster v. Wagster, 193 Ark. 902, 103 S.W. 2d 638 (1937).
38 Manney v. Manney, 59 N.E. 2d 755 (Ohio, i944).
39Isserman v. Isserman, 23 N.J. Misc. 174, 42 A. 2d 642 (I945); Gilbert v. Gilbert, 83

Ohio St. 265, 94 N.E. 421 (1911).
40
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proceedings,"41 the same considerations should apply when the divorce court
makes no provisions for alimony.42

The Estin decision, in effect, may make the adoption of the more enlightened
policy a constitutional requirement. It is not to be regretted that a state may
perhaps no longer permit an unscrupulous spouse to shed an obligation which the
state itself has imposed. For the Court's apparent holding on the due process
issue prevents not only the lax divorce laws of foreign jurisdictions, but also
the possible unconcern of the domicil for the welfare of its residents, from affecting a prior separate maintenance award.

CHOICE OF LAW BY CONTRACTUAL STIPULATION
The plaintiff's decedent, an aviation pilot employed by the defendant airlines, a Delaware corporation, was killed when his plane crashed at Birmingham, Alabama. His widow filed suit in a federal district court in Tennessee,
claiming damages for negligence on the part of the defendant' The latter defended on the ground that the terms of the decedent's contract of employment
precluded an action for damages in the event of his death or injury.
The deceased's employment contract, a form which all flying personnel were
required to sign, provided that all rights and obligations of the parties should be
governed by the laws of Pennsylvania, including the Pennsylvania Workmen's
Compensation Act. The Compensation Act limited the recovery for injury or
death of an employee to certain fixed amounts and excluded negligence actions
for damages on behalf of the employee against any employer subject to the Act.
However, the Act was specifically applicable only to accidents occurring in
Pennsylvania unless the injured person was a "Pennsylvania employee" temporarily outside the state.
The particular interstate flight in which the decedent was killed originated in
New York, but by far the major portion of his flying service had been over the
state of Pennsylvania. Each of his flights required a junction point stop at Pittsburgh, where the defendant maintained a large operating base. Two other Pennat 1216.
court in Bowers v. Bowers, 132 N.J. Eq. 431, 28 A. 2d 515 (1942), felt that failure of
the wife to ask for alimony'in a divorce proceeding which she initiated before a New Jersey
court was a mere procedural defect, inasmuch as she had already been awarded alimony in a
prior New Jersey separate maintenance proceeding. But the court in Holmes v. Holmes, 155
F. 2d 737 (App. D.C., 1946), terminated payments under a prior separate maintenance decree
in a similar situation, stating, "In asking for a final decree, it does not seem to us too much to
require that the right to receive alimony be asserted and judged in the light of the new or
pending status of the finally divorced parties. This duty is rightly that of the moving party."
Ibid., at 739.
1The defendant airline was allegedly negligent in ordering the aircraft to proceed from
Knoxville to Birmingham under extremely hazardous weather conditions and in attempting
to land the plane at Birmingham from too high an approach, at an excessive speed, with the
plane out of control, under the direction of a pilot whose orders the plaintiff was required to
obey.
41 Ibid.,
42The

